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ABSTRACT—This Essay provides an originalist appraisal of Professor James 
Bradley Thayer’s famous book on The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law. I critique Professor Thayer’s thesis on 
multiple levels, pointing out important aspects of the original understanding 
that the Framers would have had of the meaning and origins of the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as disputing Professor Thayer’s discussion of the 
history of American judicial review from 1790 to the publication of his book 
in 1893. I conclude that no person can be both an originalist and a Thayerian. 
The two theories contradict one another and cannot be jointly adhered to. I 
then explain why I prefer originalism to Thayerianism as a normative matter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern constitutional law began in the United States with the 
publication, in 1893, of James Bradley Thayer’s The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.1 In this famous book, Professor 
Thayer argues for a rule of clear mistake in horizontal separation of powers 
cases, under which the Supreme Court ought to strike down an act of 
Congress or of the President only if it is so irrational that the political branch 
has made a clear mistake.2 Professor Thayer allows slightly more vigorous 
judicial review of state laws and executive decisions, but even here he comes 
out strongly for judicial restraint and deference.3 The lesson he teaches is 
that judicial review is bad for democracy,4 is not clearly authorized by the 
Constitution,5 and should only be undertaken when a political action is 
irrational. Professor Thayer’s position is enormously influential, and it was 
accepted as scripture by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes,6 Felix 
Frankfurter,7 William H. Rehnquist,8 and Byron White.9 His views show up 
as well in the writings of Judge Robert H. Bork10 and Justice Antonin 
Scalia,11 both of whom often confuse originalism with the analytically 
distinct concept of Thayerian judicial restraint. 
 
 1 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893). 
 2 Id. at 18. 
 3 Id. at 28–29. 
 4 See id. at 29–30. 
 5 Id. at 3–4. Professor Thayer argued that the original meaning of the Constitution should be ignored. 
See id. at 24. 
 6 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes’s 
lone dissent, unlike Justice Harlan’s, rejected the idea of substantive due process altogether rather than 
merely disagreeing with the way in which the majority had applied that doctrine. Id. 
 7 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267–70 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice 
Frankfurter believed that malapportionment of electoral districts could only be fixed by the political 
branches of government, and he thus opposed the one-person, one-vote rule. Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion tried to limit unenumerated rights to only those which are deeply rooted in history and 
tradition. Id. 
 9 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1986) (holding that unenumerated rights 
were limited to only those deeply rooted in history and tradition and that therefore the states could 
criminalize sexual relations between same sex couples). 
 10 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW  
1–5, 11 (1990) (“Either the Constitution and statutes are law, which means that their principles are known 
and control judges, or they are malleable texts that judges may rewrite to see that particular groups or 
political causes win.”). 
 11 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 41–47 
(1997) (“[T]he ‘evolving’ Constitution has imposed a vast array of new constraints—new inflexibilities—
upon administrative, judicial, and legislative action.”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) (“[T]he legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor 
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I consider myself to be a committed originalist, which means that I 
believe the Supreme Court ought to decide constitutional cases in accord 
with the original public meaning of the relevant text as it applies to the 
circumstances of our modern world. I am both an originalist and a living 
constitutionalist in that I agree with Judge Bork, who once wrote that “[t]he 
world changes in which unchanging values find their application.”12 I would 
tweak Judge Bork’s comment slightly to say, “The world changes in which 
unchanging texts find their application.” I consider it unconstitutional for the 
Supreme Court to make up new rights out of thin air—a power that Justice 
William O. Douglas apparently thought he had.13 But I consider it equally 
unconstitutional for the Supreme Court to erase constitutional rights that 
actually are in the Constitution, and that is what the adoption of Thayerian 
reasoning would lead to.14 
I doubt that Professor Thayer understood how much harm his writing 
would do, and I hope that if he had understood it, he would have 
reconsidered. But it is necessary for us, as constitutional law scholars, to tell 
the history of Thayerian restraint in an unflattering yet true way if we are to 
properly assess the value of this approach to constitutional decision-making 
and to expose its opposition to originalism. This Essay, then, expresses my 
opposition to Thayerian constitutionalism and presents what I hope you will 
find to be an informative discussion of five topics having to do with the 
framing of our Constitution, which undermine Professor Thayer’s historical 
premises. 
In so doing, this short Essay is designed to introduce you to some 
important ideas that were widely discussed at the time of the framing of the 
Constitution and that bear on the modern debate between originalism, living 
constitutionalism, and Thayerian restraint. My claim is that the worlds of the 
1770s and 1780s, and of the 1860s, were actually a more normatively 
appealing time from which to draw constitutional principles than was the 
world between 1893 and 1945. I will suggest to you that in many ways we 
have returned or are returning to a time when most intellectuals believe that 
all men are born free and equal and have natural and inalienable rights, and 
we are leaving behind the progressive era of judicial passivity, rule by expert 
agencies, eugenics laws, the Holocaust, and Jim Crow segregation. 
 
of social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in 
England, prevail.”). 
 12 BORK, supra note 10, at 168. 
 13 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (making up a so-called right to 
privacy, which had no discernible roots in American history and tradition). 
 14 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20, 223 (1944). The six-Justice majority 
in this case was judicially restrained because they chose not to interfere with the actions of the political 
branches even though they ought to have done so. 
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In Part I, I will provide the necessary background information to 
understand Thayerian restraint, Professor Thayer’s theory, and the contexts 
in which it was adopted. Part II then develops a historical record against 
which to analyze Thayerian restraint. In this Part, I will discuss (1) a concept 
that was alive and well in the 1780s and that is of direct relevance to 
originalism, called the idea of the Ancient Constitution; (2) a concept that 
was alive and well in the 1780s, and which was of direct relevance to 
originalism, called the Mixed Regime origins of our structural constitution; 
(3) the legacy of the British Empire for the American colonies’ constitutional 
system, with some comments, where appropriate, about originalism; and (4) 
the normative case for having a written constitution backed up by judicial 
review that enforces the original public meaning of the constitutional text 
contra to the teaching of Professor Thayer. Finally, in Part III, I will discuss 
the Supreme Court’s actual practice in exercising the power of judicial 
review from 1790 to 1893, when James Bradley Thayer wrote his famous 
book. I will show in this last Part that Professor Thayer misdescribes the 
Supreme Court’s actual practice in exercising the power of judicial review 
between 1790 and 1893 and is therefore wrong to claim that his rule of clear 
mistake was deeply rooted in American history and tradition.15 
I. THAYERIAN RESTRAINT 
Before evaluating the relationship between Professor Thayer’s theory 
of judicial restraint and originalism, one must understand Professor Thayer’s 
argument and the way his theory has been adopted and utilized. This Part 
provides that necessary background. 
A. Thayer’s Rule of Clear Mistake 
James Bradley Thayer’s rule of clear mistake is a rule that provides that 
courts, when exercising their power of judicial review, should strike down 
an act of Congress or of the President only if it so clearly violates the 
Constitution that no rational person could conclude otherwise. Professor 
Thayer allows for somewhat more vigorous enforcement of the Constitution 
when state laws or state executive actions are under review, but even here 
Professor Thayer calls for radical deference to the social and economic 
decisions made by the political branches of the government. Professor 
Thayer’s rule of clear mistake would, if adopted, eliminate most forms of 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. 
 
 15 THAYER, supra note 1, at 17–26. 
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B. Early Adoption of Thayerian Restraint and Tragic Consequences 
It is important, in evaluating Professor Thayer, to keep in mind that he 
was a Progressive Era intellectual who, like most Progressives in the 1890s, 
probably disfavored the Madisonian system of checks and balances, the 
original meaning of our written Constitution and Bill of Rights, and judicial 
review, and who probably favored responsible parliamentary government, 
which then prevailed in the United Kingdom and which Woodrow Wilson 
alleged to have been “shown” superior to the American system.16 Woodrow 
Wilson was an impractical intellectual who would go on to serve as President 
of Princeton University, Governor of New Jersey, and, for two terms, 
President of the United States. Like Wilson, Professor Thayer probably 
thought the Constitution, as originally designed, was a disguised structure 
for helping the rich to rob the poor.17 
The Progressives, in general, were Social Darwinists who believed in 
the survival of the fittest, the compulsory sterilization of the feeble-minded,18 
and Jim Crow segregation.19 The Progressives also believed in government 
by experts.20 They did not believe in democracy. They favored parliamentary 
government with no checks and balances because it could get things done 
quickly.21 The Progressives disliked courts, judicial review, originalism, and 
 
 16 Walter Lippmann, Introduction to WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A 
STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 7, 13–14 (Meridian 1956) (1885). 
 17 This thesis is advanced in Chapters 2 through 6 of CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). 
 18 EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A 
MASTER RACE 68–69, 320, 322 (2003) (Woodrow Wilson and the eugenics movement); DAVID M. KIDD, 
“HISTORY WRITTEN WITH LIGHTNING”: RELIGION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THOMAS DIXON, JR. 129 (2013), https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3407& 
context=etd [https://perma.cc/Z879-42E3]; CHRIS MEIER, 70 YEARS OF AMERICAN CAPTIVITY: THE 
POLITY OF GOD, THE BIRTH OF A NATION, AND THE BETRAYAL OF GOVERNMENT (2016); JAMES Q. 
WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 
141 (2017) (Theodore Roosevelt and the eugenics movement). 
 19 President Wilson introduced Jim Crow segregation into the federal cabinet departments for the 
first time when he ordered them to be racially segregated. He had large screens put in rooms so that white 
employees could not see African-American employees, Chris Bodenner, The Racist Legacy of Woodrow 
Wilson, Cont’d, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2015, 11:35 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/11/the-
racist-legacy-of-woodrow-wilson-contd/417990 [https://perma.cc/FA2S-UT8B], and he had the first-
ever White House screening of the movie Birth of a Nation, which was produced by the Ku Klux Klan to 
encourage the lynching of African-Americans. Most of the lynching of African-Americans that occurred 
in American history happened in the wake of the release of this movie. DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND REFORM, 1900–1917, at 32, 47, 53, 128 (2005); see 
MEIER, supra note 18. 
 20 Kevin A. Carson, Taylorism, Progressivism, and Rule by Experts, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 
24, 2011), https://fee.org/articles/taylorism-progressivism-and-rule-by-experts [https://perma.cc/2YFE-
VM4A]. 
 21 See Lippmann, supra note 16, at 13–14 (explaining that Woodrow Wilson preferred the United 
Kingdom’s system of parliamentary government to the U.S. system of checks and balances). 
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bills of rights, which they saw as tools of the rich.22 They thought courts 
should stay out of the way of their expert commissions led by eugenically 
bred men to produce a Brave New World with many classes of people.23 
I do not know how thoroughly Professor Thayer embraced the 
Progressive creed, but Progressive politicians certainly embraced Professor 
Thayer’s theory of judicial review, including Theodore Roosevelt and Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. We know some of the outcomes that Thayerian 
judges reached between 1927 and 1954, and their recounting is a very sorry 
story. Too often, Professor Thayer and Justice Holmes are praised for 
reaching the right outcome in Lochner v. New York.24 It is time to look at the 
dark side of Justice Holmes’s and Professor Thayer’s approach. 
Please consider now some outcomes, to which Thayerian restraint has 
clearly contributed. Three years after Professor Thayer published his clarion 
call for judicial restraint, the Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson25 by 
a vote of seven to one, over the lone dissent of the first Justice Harlan. Justice 
Henry Billings Brown produced a very judicially restrained majority opinion 
that upheld the constitutionality of Jim Crow-era racial segregation on 
railway cars under the so-called doctrine of “separate but equal.”26 Justice 
Brown was utterly wrong, of course, but he did what Professor Thayer urged 
all judges to do, and upheld Louisiana’s separate but equal law on judicial 
restraint grounds. Justice Brown could imagine a rational basis for 
Louisiana’s law, and under Professor Thayer’s view, that was enough to 
uphold the constitutionality of the challenged law. Plessy is an abomination 
both morally and doctrinally to originalists like me,27 but it constitutes a 
paradigm example of Thayerian judicial restraint in action. 
 
 22 Lochner, in the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, “strained to the utmost (and, indeed, in 
[his] opinion, violated) the Constitution in order to sustain a do-nothing philosophy which ha[d] 
everywhere completely broken down when applied to the actual conditions of modern life.” Theodore 
Roosevelt, Judges and Progress, OUTLOOK, Jan. 6, 1912, at 40, 44; Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: 
Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 411 (2005) (quoting id.). 
 23 On the rise of the Progressive Movement and on its commitment to expert agencies, see PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). Aldous Huxley developed this dystopian 
vision in his 1932 novel Brave New World. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). 
 24 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing for the constitutionality of a New 
York statute restricting the maximum hours bakery or confectionary establishment employees may work). 
The first Justice Harlan also reached this result, but his dissent was far better than Justice Holmes’s. 
Justice Holmes argued that liberty of contract ought never to be protected, id., whereas Justice Harlan 
argued wisely that New York’s 60-hour work week for bakers was a reasonable regulation of liberty of 
contract, which was just and was enacted for the general good of the whole people, id. at 73 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 25 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 26 See id. at 543. 
 27 See Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 432 (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education accurately reflected the 
113:1419 (2019) Originalism and James Bradley Thayer 
1425 
By ruling as it did in Plessy, the Supreme Court ushered in a fifty-eight-
year period during which “separate but equal” was the supreme law of the 
land. This ran completely counter to the originalist history of a constitutional 
ban on governmental race discrimination.28 The damage that Jim Crow 
segregation caused during these fifty-eight years is incalculable in the harm 
done both to African-Americans and to the nation as a whole, including its 
reputation throughout the world. The opinion in Plessy alone, coming as it 
did just three years after Professor Thayer published his path-breaking 
article, proves just how dangerous Thayerian restraint can be. 
Thayerian restraint continued to demonstrate its harmful influence 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In Debs v. United States, 
for example, Justice Holmes’s opinion exhibited Thayerian restraint in 
unanimously upholding as constitutional a ten-year prison sentence for 
Eugene V. Debs, the head of the American Socialist Party, for allegedly 
urging workers to resist the draft in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.29 
Debs’s speeches were obviously protected by the First Amendment, but 
Justice Holmes and his fellow Justices left the Wilson Administration free to 
jail Debs for ten years. 
Similarly, in Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes upheld the constitutionality 
of a Virginia law that mandated the compulsory sterilization of the feeble-
minded, asserting that “[t]he [same] principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”30 This restrained opinion contributed 
to some 60,000 compulsory sterilizations performed in the United States, 
most of which occurred after the Court endorsed these laws.31 When Adolf 
Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, one of the first things he did was 
to pass a eugenics law modeled on the American eugenics laws, afraid that 
 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism 
and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1395 (arguing that Loving v. Virginia accurately 
reflected the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 28 I explore this history in previous law review articles. See Calabresi & Perl, supra note 27; Calabresi 
& Matthews, supra note 27. 
 29 249 U.S. 211, 212–13, 216–17. Debs received more than 900,000 votes as the  
Socialist Party candidate in the election of 1912, Debs’ Willingness to Speak Truth to Power  
Admirable, THE REPUBLIC (Aug. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.therepublic.com/2018/08/22/ 
debs_willingness_to_speak_truth_to_power_admirable [https://perma.cc/C8V4-L4F9], and spoke about 
how the working class, who were being drafted to fight in World War I, were mere cannon fodder for a 
struggle between imperialist European powers in which the United States had nothing at stake. Debs, 
249 U.S. at 213–14. 
 30 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (internal citation omitted). 
 31 FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES NATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RACE AND MEMBERSHIP IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT 198 (2002); see also VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN 
RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 31 (2008). 
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America was beating Germany at its own game.32 It took the Supreme 
Court’s activist ruling in Skinner v. Oklahoma33 and the publicizing of the 
Holocaust to put an end to the American eugenics movement,34 which Justice 
Holmes had done so much to help. 
Justice Holmes was not the only Justice to employ Thayerian restraint 
to uphold unconstitutional laws with detrimental effects. In Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law that 
required Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance35 in violation of their right to the free exercise of their religion and 
in violation of their right not to be compelled to speak.36 In his concurrence 
in Adamson v. California, Justice Frankfurter argued against the 
incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights on judicial restraint grounds.37 In 
yet another pernicious example of Thayerian restraint, Justice Frankfurter 
argued against a constitutional rule requiring reapportioning electoral 
districts after the census in Colegrove v. Green,38 a decision that remained 
good law for more than fifteen years. In Korematsu v. United States, 
Thayerian restraint led the Court to uphold, as an exercise of the wartime 
emergency power, the racial internment of Japanese-Americans in 
concentration camps.39 This holding was just symbolically overturned in 
June of 2018 in Trump v. Hawaii.40 
In Goesaert v. Cleary, Justice Frankfurter wrote a six-to-three majority 
decision holding that classifications on the basis of sex deserve only rational 
basis scrutiny41—i.e., Thayerian review. This decision overlooked Justice 
Sutherland’s statement in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, where the Supreme 
Court struck down a sex-discriminatory law that mandated women but not 
men be paid a minimum wage, that  
 
 32 BLACK, supra note 18, at 275–77; STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN 
RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 15–20, 88, 95 (1994); WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 8–9, 
33, 51–52. 
 33 316 U.S. 535, 541–43 (1942) (holding that American eugenics laws violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34 BLACK, supra note 19, at 411–26. 
 35 310 U.S. 586, 599–600 (1940). 
 36 Thankfully, this case was overruled three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 37 332 U.S. 46, 59–68 (1947) (“The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move 
within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely 
personal judgment.”). 
 38 328 U.S. 549, 552–56 (1946). 
 39 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944). 
 40 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 41 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948). 
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[i]n view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken 
place since [Muller v. Oregon], in the contractual, political and civil status of 
women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to 
say that [the differences between the sexes] have now come almost, if not quite, 
to the vanishing point.42  
Thayerian Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes quipped in dissent that “[i]t will 
need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no 
differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot take those 
differences into account.”43 There remained a rational basis test for sex 
classifications when the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed44 due to 
Justices Holmes and Frankfurter’s common mania for Thayerian restraint. 
Suffice it to say that Thayerian restraint has unquestionably led to some 
truly terrible case law. A question still remains, however, as to what the 
Framers’ original understanding was with respect to liberty, equality, and 
constitutional rights. Moreover, we must ask why the Framers admired our 
Constitution of checks and balances and thought it would benefit all of 
society, not only the rich. 
II. ORIGINALISM’S JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In contrast to Thayerian restraint and the Progressive approach of the 
early twentieth century, the Framers’ understanding of liberty, equality, and 
constitutional rights informed their approach to judicial review, which thus 
also informs originalism’s approach. In this Part, I outline this approach by 
discussing (1) the idea of the Ancient Constitution; (2) the Mixed Regime 
origins of our structural constitution; (3) the legacy of the British Empire for 
the American colonies’ constitutional system; and (4) the normative 
desirability of a written constitution. 
A. Originalism and the Ancient Constitution 
In the 1760s and 1770s, the North American colonists repeatedly 
affirmed their belief in Sir Edward Coke’s idea that England originally had 
an unwritten Ancient Constitution that predated Magna Carta of 1215, and 
the colonists asserted that they, as Englishmen, were entitled to the 
unenumerated rights affirmed in the Ancient Constitution.45 The Theory of 
 
 42 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923). 
 43 Id. at 569–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 44 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause a sex-
discriminatory law using the rational basis test). 
 45 JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LIBERTY 3–16 (2005); Paul Christianson, Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John 
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the Ancient Constitution as England’s original constitution was first 
articulated and developed by Sir Edward Coke between 1603 and 1634.46 
Coke developed his idea that England originally had an Ancient 
Constitution of liberty while fighting the living constitution claims of Kings 
James I and Charles I to absolute power under the theory of the so-called 
“Divine Right of Kings.” Coke argued that England had been a 
constitutional, limited monarchy since the reign of the last Anglo-Saxon 
king, Edward the Confessor, from 1042 to his death in 1066.47 Coke believed 
that Englishmen before the Norman Conquest had an Ancient Constitution, 
which was mostly unwritten, with a limited monarchy, that could make 
decisions only with the Witan, or Council of Elders. Coke thought the Anglo-
Saxons had brought this constitution of freedom with them from Germany 
when they conquered England. Coke relied on the Roman writer Tacitus, 
who wrote a book called Germania setting out the idea of the Ancient 
Constitution and of an elective kingship, based on his observations of the 
Germans during his lifetime between 56 and 120 A.D.48 Thomas Jefferson 
was so taken with Coke’s reverence for Tacitus’s book that he recommended 
to many people that they read it to see the origins of American liberty. 
Coke believed that English history since the Norman Conquest had 
been a constant struggle between Englishmen, who never gave up their belief 
in the Ancient Constitution and its liberties, and English Norman kings, who 
sought to impose what Coke’s followers called “the Yoke of the Norman 
Oppression” on Englishmen. When William the Conqueror conquered 
England in 1066, he went out of his way to claim that Edward the Confessor, 
who had died in 1066 of natural causes, had designated him—William—and 
not King Harold II, to be his legitimate successor. William the Conqueror’s 
Norman soldiers won the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and killed Harold II, but 
William faced a huge practical problem in governing a nation of two million 
Englishmen with a Norman army of only about 15,000 soldiers. William the 
Conqueror sought to win over his new subjects’ loyalty by agreeing to 
govern England according to the laws of Edward the Confessor, which were 
 
Selden, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 89 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993). 
 46 During this period Coke was Lord Chief Justice of England; he was fired as a judge by King  
James I; he was elected to the House of Commons; and he wrote, and forced King Charles I to sign, the 
Petition of Right in 1628, which affirmed that the King could not impose taxes without the prior approval 
of Parliament. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE (1552–1634), at 3–536 (1957); J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE 
FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY IN ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1957) 
(arguing that Coke invented the idea of the Ancient Constitution out of whole cloth for political purposes). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See TACITUS, GERMANIA (J. B. Rives trans., 1999). 
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then called the Leges Edwardii. William the Conqueror made a point of 
having himself crowned in Westminster Abbey, a church built by Edward 
the Confessor and the place where Edward was buried, to emphasize the 
continuity of the Norman regime with Edward the Confessor’s regime. 
William the Conqueror pledged in his coronation oath that he would retain 
the Leges Edwardii, and his son Henry I made the same pledge in his 
coronation oath in 1100 called the Charter of Liberties. 
According to Coke, King John violated the Leges Edwardii, which led 
to the revolt of his barons and people, who forced King John to sign Magna 
Carta in 1215, which recommitted the English monarchy to the original 
Leges Edwardii. Coke was adamant that Magna Carta was “no new thing,” 
but was simply an originalist restoration of England’s ancient Anglo-Saxon 
constitution of liberty. King John died soon after signing Magna Carta, and 
his son King Henry III developed a cult around Edward the Confessor and 
lavishly rebuilt Westminster Abbey with Edward the Confessor’s tomb in 
the central spot behind the altar, where it can still be seen today. Henry III 
named his son, King Edward I, after Edward the Confessor, and the cult of 
following the Leges Edwardii flourished. From 1215 to 1485, England had 
a constitutional, limited monarchy, according to Coke. During this period of 
time, five kings were removed from the throne by Parliament and executed: 
Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI, Edward V, and Richard III. In 1485, the 
Tudor dynasty came to power and the regicide stopped, but every Tudor 
monarch, including Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, took scrupulous care to get 
parliamentary backing for all that they did. 
Coke charged King James I (1603–1625) and his son King Charles I 
(1625–1649) with violating the original Ancient Constitution and the Leges 
Edwardii by imposing a Yoke of Norman Oppression on the English people, 
in accord with the Stuart kings’ belief in absolute monarchy and the divine 
right of kings. Coke developed the idea of the Ancient Constitution in part 
in The Case of Monopolies, which held that only Parliament and not the king 
acting alone could grant a monopoly,49 and in part in Dr. Bonham’s Case, 
where he said that even an act of Parliament could be set aside if it violated 
the common law, which reflected the Ancient Constitution.50 
The Whig historians all bought Coke’s claims about the Ancient 
Constitution,51 as did the Puritans, both in England and in New England, for 
whom Coke was a hero because he had stood up against Stuart absolutism 
 
 49 Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies) (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (KB). 
 50 Bonham v. Coll. of Physicians (Dr. Bonham’s Case) (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (KB). 
 51 See generally 4 PAUL DE RAPIN THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, AS WELL 
ECCLESIASTICAL AS CIVIL (Nicolas Tindal trans., 1728) (a Whig history of England that acknowledges 
the reality of the Ancient Constitution). 
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and High Church Anglicanism. Coke’s history of England arguing that 
Magna Carta was merely a reaffirmation of the Ancient Constitution has 
been challenged by J.G.A. Pocock.52 But, whether Coke is right or wrong in 
his claims about English legal history in the eyes of twentieth-century 
historians is irrelevant to a study of what the American colonists believed 
from 1620 to 1776. They all believed Coke was right and that they were the 
heirs of England’s Ancient Constitution and of the Leges Edwardii.53 
The American colonists were ardent backers of Sir Edward Coke’s 
historical claims, especially in Puritan New England. James Otis, during the 
controversy over the writs of assistance, repeatedly invoked Coke’s claims 
about the Ancient Constitution, much to the annoyance of the royal governor 
of Massachusetts. The colonists’ belief that “no taxation without 
representation” was an ancient constitutional right derived from the Petition 
of Right of 1628. This document, drafted by Coke and enacted by Parliament 
with Charles I’s consent, codified the ancient constitutional right of “no 
taxation without representation.” It outlawed Charles I’s practice of 
imprisoning wealthy men on a whim and then releasing them only if they 
loaned Charles I money, which he never repaid. The American colonists at 
the time of the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights believed that they were the heirs to a great 
tradition of unenumerated original English liberties. 
The idea of the Ancient Constitution, which bound King George III and 
Parliament, was a precursor to the modern idea of originalism. Just as 
modern originalists believe there are ancient rights and liberties upon which 
the government cannot transgress, so, too, did Americans, between 1760 and 
the ratification of the Ninth Amendment in 1791, believe in vast 
unenumerated rights protected by the Ancient Constitution to which they 
were heir.54 It is important to understand the modern constitutional debate 
over unenumerated rights and the Ninth Amendment to know about the 
belief of colonial Americans in the Ancient Constitution. 
B. Originalism and Mixed Regimes 
Most educated Americans between 1776 and 1791 believed that a good 
feature of the British Constitution, as it had existed since the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, was that it was a balanced constitution, which embraced 
 
 52 See generally POCOCK, supra note 46. 
 53 See REID, supra note 45, at 9; Christianson, supra note 45, at 89–146. 
 54 The colonists, in resisting George III, thought they were resisting the Yoke of the Norman 
oppression. They further thought that the unenumerated rights protected by the Ancient Constitution were 
enforceable in court, in line with Coke’s belief. H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: 
WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 25–47, 71–99 (1965). 
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Aristotelian ideas about the normative appeal of a Mixed Regime.55 The U.S. 
Constitution, in addition to the separation of powers, established a 
democratized form of the mixed regime and a system of checks and 
balances.56 To understand what a mixed regime was requires a bit of a foray 
into political philosophy. 
In The Politics, Aristotle describes three separate kinds of regimes: 
government by one person; government by a few people; and government by 
all the people. Aristotle argues that there are good and bad variations on each 
regime type.57 When governments of one person are good, we call them 
monarchies, and when they are bad, we call them tyrannies. When 
governments of a few people are good, we call them aristocracies, and when 
they are bad, we call them oligarchies. When governments of all the people 
are good, we call them democracies, and when they are bad, we call them 
instances of mob rule. 
Aristotle argues that government of one person has the advantage of 
offering energy in the execution of foreign policy, in winning wars, and in 
subduing powerful, oppressive domestic factions.58 He further argues that 
governments of a few people may harness expert knowledge and wisdom.59 
And he argues that government of all the people has the advantage that it 
harnesses common knowledge and promotes liberty. He also thought that, in 
a Mixed Regime of the One, the Few, and the Many, each entity would check 
and balance the others, thereby diminishing the chance of a bad regime type 
emerging.60 Because power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely,61 a Mixed Regime with shared powers is less likely to turn into a 
deviant form. 
Aristotle implies that the ideal regime should be part monarchy, part 
aristocracy, and part democracy. He thinks such a regime of the One, the 
Few, and the Many will realize the benefits of each regime type. Aristotle’s 
thoughts on the normative appeal of Mixed Regimes were greatly developed 
by the Greek philosopher Polybius, who argued in The Histories that Sparta 
had defeated Athens and the Roman Republic had conquered Greece because 
 
 55 M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 52–82 (1967). 
 56 Steven G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the Separation 
of Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 535–36 (2012). 
 57 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 82 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge University Press 1988). 
 58 Id. at 75–76; 6 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES 7 (W. R. Paton trans., 1960). 
 59 ARISTOTLE, supra note 57, at 76–77. 
 60 Id. at 93. 
 61 Letter from Lord Acton to Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON 
FREEDOM AND POWER 329, 335 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1972). 
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Sparta and Rome had Mixed Regimes.62 Subsequently, Cicero,63 St. Thomas 
Aquinas,64 and Machiavelli65 all argued in favor of Mixed Regimes. 
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England confirmed that, from 1688 
until American independence in 1776, Great Britain itself had a Mixed 
Regime of the One, the Few, and the Many. Britain in the 1760s and 1770s 
had a Mixed Regime with a constitutional monarch, George III, who had real 
but constitutionally limited powers.66 Britain during this time was also a 
regime of the few aristocrats who were represented in the still powerful 
House of Lords and in the life-tenured upper class English judiciary. The 
British government also represented all the people to a degree in the House 
of Commons, which was becoming more and more important to English 
governance.67 The important thing to realize here is that when the 
Constitution was written, England was still a Mixed Regime, in which the 
king and the House of Lords were not yet ciphers—as they are today.68 Some 
Americans colonists, like Alexander Hamilton, believed that the English 
Constitution was the best constitution in the world, and that the United States 
ought to simply emulate the British model.69 
The idea of separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers does not 
appear in political philosophy until 1748 in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the 
Laws.70 Montesquieu realized that in the post-feudal Enlightenment Era, 
hereditary monarchies and Houses of Lords would be done away with, but 
he identified the advantage that Mixed Regimes offered against the 
corrupting influence of power. Montesquieu thus came up with the brilliant 
and totally novel idea that perhaps the separation of legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers could substitute for the Mixed Regime. No country, 
however, tried to set up a functional separation of powers between 1748 and 
1776, so it was left to the American colonies and to the Framers to figure out 
 
 62 POLYBIUS, supra note 58, at 7. 
 63 See CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS bks. 2, 23 (T. E. Page et al. eds., Clinton Walker Keyes 
trans., 1928); ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 225–32 (1999) 
(describing the changes Cicero proposed in De Legibus). 
 64 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM, in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS 181, bk. 1, ch. 6 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 3, 86–91 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953). 
 65 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIUS, in 2 THE 
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 93, 109–14 (Christian 
E. Detmold trans., 1891). Machiavelli described the highly successful Republic of Venice (810 A.D. to 
1797 A.D.) as one such regime. Id. 
 66 VILE, supra note 55, at 52–82. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). 
 70 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., trans., 1989) (1748). 
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if such a scheme could work. In particular, no one had a clear idea about 
which powers were “legislative,” “executive,” or “judicial,” because there 
was no prior precedent on point.71 
State constitutions between 1776 and 1787 were the first to embrace 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers idea, but state legislatures were made 
too powerful, and state executives too weak, causing the Framers to look 
beyond mere separation of powers to ensure a regime of checks and 
balances.72 The Constitution of 1787 does create a separation of powers 
regime, but it also implements a subtly democratized form of the English 
Mixed Regime of the One, the Few, and the Many.73 The One President, 
picked by an electoral college, was originally a tamed prince or democratic 
monarch. The Few senators, picked for six-year terms, as well as the life-
tenured judges whom they confirmed, would be, it was hoped, a kind of 
natural aristocracy of talents. And the Many were originally represented in 
the House of Representatives, which they directly elected every two years. 
Today, the Many pick the One President in presidential elections, and the 
Many have directly elected the Few senators to their six-year terms since 
1913. So, in 2018, the United States government is a government of the One 
President, the Few senators and federal judges, and the Many members of 
the House of Representatives; but the Many get to pick the One every four 
years and the Few every six years. Even the Few naturally talented aristocrats 
on the bench are picked by the President and the Senate in a way that follows 
national election results.74 
As a result, our government over the last 230 years has demonstrated 
all the structural advantages to its Constitution that led philosophers like 
Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Aquinas, and Machiavelli to praise Mixed 
Regimes. Our Presidents have led us to victory in the Civil War, World War 
I, World War II, and the Cold War, as well as in a host of other conflicts. 
The United States has been the dominant player in global foreign policy since 
at least 1945, and it remains so today. We have the largest military force on 
the planet, and yet we have never suffered a coup d’état. The original hope 
of the strength of the One has been fully realized. Moreover, the Senate and 
the Supreme Court today are aristocracies of natural talent, realizing the 
originalist hope of government by the wisest. Finally, our democracy is the 
 
 71 See Calabresi et al., supra note 56, at 533–34. 
 72 CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 25–54, 76–165 (1923); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James 
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oldest in the world and has become more perfect over time as a result of the 
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments75 and the Progressive 
Amendments.76 The originalist hope that we would become ever more 
democratic has therefore been realized as well. Our unique Constitution is 
one that Aristotle and Machiavelli would both have recognized and loved. 
Unfortunately, most Americans today appreciate neither the excellence of 
the structural Constitution nor its origins in political thought and history. 
C. Originalism and the Colonial Legacy Left to the United States 
All thirteen of the original colonies were initially governed by a written 
corporate charter issued by the King of England at the time each colony was 
formed. These written charters limited and enumerated the powers of 
colonially elected assemblies, royal governors, governor’s councils, and 
relations with the mother country. They were interpreted and enforced by the 
King’s own Privy Council, an imperial Supreme Court.77 The King selected 
the members of the Privy Council, and through them he exercised his 
prerogative powers over affairs in the thirteen colonies.78 From 1607 until 
1760, Parliament made no attempt to govern the colonies, which were totally 
governed by the King and his Privy Council. 
Several consequences developed from the 169-year-long colonial-era 
governance structure that warrant comment. First, it is not surprising that 
when Parliament tried for the first time in 1765 to tax the American colonies 
directly by imposing a stamp act rather than indirectly by imposing tariffs, 
all hell broke loose.79 From the American perspective, the colonists thought 
they shared a king with England but not a Parliament. This was a reasonable 
presumption for Americans to have had because (1) Parliament had not tried 
to tax the colonies for the first 158 years of their existence, and (2) the 
Petition of Right of 1628 had established that taxation without representation 
was a violation of the British Constitution. 
Second, during the 169 years of colonial rule, the American colonists 
had become used to existing within the British imperial regime in which a 
central court—the Privy Council—could hear appeals of all cases from the 
highest court of a colony and could exercise the power of judicial review by 
 
 75 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
 76 See id., amends. XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX. 
 77 The Privy Council sometimes called a committee of itself the Board of Trade. MARY SARAH 
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COUNCIL 1833–1876: ITS ORIGINS, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 1–72 (1979). 
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interpreting the colony’s limited and enumerated grants of powers and 
striking down colonial acts that were, as Professor Bilder writes, “repugnant 
to the laws of England.”80 The American colonists thus became intimately 
familiar with vertical judicial review.81 
Third, the colonists also became habituated to being governed by a 
written document that divided and allocated power. Thus, when on July 4, 
1776, the thirteen colonies declared their independence, it is not surprising 
that eleven of them wrote new state constitutions while, in those that did 
not—Connecticut and Rhode Island—the legislatures adopted the colonial 
charters to be their state constitutions with all references to the King excised. 
Fourth, it is similarly unsurprising that when the colonists defeated the 
British and won the Revolutionary War, they chose to write a federal treaty, 
the Articles of Confederation, to set out the limited and enumerated powers 
of the new federal government and the responsibilities of each state to the 
others. 
Finally, it is not surprising that when a new constitution was deemed 
necessary, it took the form of a written document including a bill of rights, 
nor that the Supreme Court of the new government picked up where the Privy 
Council left off in exercising the power of vertical judicial review by a 
federal court of state laws.82 
Moreover, it must be noted that when the sovereignty of the  
King-in-Parliament-with-the-House-of-Lords-and-the-House-of-Commons 
(the One, the Few, and the Many) fell, it was replaced with a new conception 
of sovereignty: “We the People of the United States.”83 Because the 
sovereign people delegated the legislative, executive, and judicial powers to 
separate entities, the courts necessarily acquired the duty, when deciding 
cases or controversies properly before them, to enforce the Constitution 
horizontally against Congress and the President as well as vertically against 
the states. 
As Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 78: 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains 
certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as 
that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. 
 
 80 See generally BILDER, supra note 77, at 1. 
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Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through 
the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the 
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts 
void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that 
the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. 
It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void must 
necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this 
doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief 
discussion of the grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. 
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of 
a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is 
exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can 
be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his 
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the 
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of 
powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they 
forbid. 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of 
their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive 
upon the other departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural 
presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the 
Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could 
intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that 
of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were 
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in 
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of 
the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a 
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well 
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If 
there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that 
which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; 
or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the 
intention of the people to the intention of their agents. 
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior 
to both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands 
in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought 
to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their 
decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not 
fundamental. 
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This exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory 
laws is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens that there 
are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other 
and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a 
case, it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and 
operation. So far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each 
other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is 
impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one in exclusion 
of the other. The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their 
relative validity is that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But 
this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law but from 
the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by 
legislative provision but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and 
propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They 
thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that 
which was the last indication of its will should have the preference. 
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority of 
an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the 
converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act 
of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and 
subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute 
contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to 
adhere to the latter and disregard the former. 
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, 
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the 
legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; 
or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The 
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to 
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if 
it proved anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from 
that body. 
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a 
strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will 
contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must 
be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.84 
Hamilton’s essay in The Federalist No. 78 similarly gave notice that the 
new Constitution would vest the Supreme Court with the power of judicial 
review, horizontally against Congress and the President as well as vertically 
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between the federal government and the states.85 Vigorous horizontal judicial 
review was thus contemplated by the Framers, contrary to what Professor 
Thayer asserted in The Origin and Scope of American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law. Neither Alexander Hamilton nor his Antifederalist 
opponent Brutus, writing in Essay 11, contemplated a rule of clear mistake 
as a precondition for exercising the power of judicial review. 
D. Originalism and the Normative Argument for Our Written Constitution 
with Judicial Review 
With this important history in mind, the next question that arises is 
whether it is desirable to have a written constitution that establishes judicial 
review according to the original public meaning of the text as part of a 
Madisonian system of checks and balances to enforce the terms of the written 
text. Consider the following eight arguments. 
First, the written Constitution of 1787 was necessary to “constitute,” or 
bring into being, (1) a stronger national government, (2) an executive branch 
of the national government headed up by the President, (3) an independent 
national life-tenured judiciary, and (4) a federal Bill of Rights to protect 
rights. An originalist construction of the constitutional text helps accomplish 
this goal. 
Second, a written Constitution makes it easier to know what is 
constitutional and what is not. The Framers were tired of arguing for decades 
with the British as to what rights were and were not among the fundamental 
rights of Englishmen protected by the common law and the Ancient 
Constitution. Getting it down in writing, even if only partially, was a distinct 
improvement over the British unwritten constitution. We still have implied 
powers, which Congress may exercise under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,86 and we still have unenumerated rights against the national 
government under the Ninth Amendment.87 But much of our Constitution is 
committed to writing, which makes it easier to find and enforce its content 
than its British counterpart. A focus on the original public meaning of 
constitutional powers and rights helps greatly in identifying what is in the 
text of the document. 
 
 85 See id. at 467 (“If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between [the Constitution 
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this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 87 Id. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
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Third, because sometimes in the heat of passion legislatures and groups 
of people do foolish things that they will later regret, the constitutional 
structure helps constrain the passions of the moment. The metaphor here is 
of Ulysses chaining himself to the mast of his sailboat so he could hear the 
songs of the sirens, but not jump overboard and seek to join them, thus 
leading to his death. With the written Constitution, enforced through judicial 
review according to the original public meaning of the text, we have chained 
ourselves to the mast of a written constitution. Living constitutionalism or 
Thayerian deference might give the passions of the moment too much sway, 
as happened in Plessy88 and in Korematsu.89 
Fourth, the Constitution requires bicameralism and presentment to 
make national law, which in effect requires that national supermajorities 
favor a law before it can be made. This promotes certainty and predictability, 
which is great for authors and investors. Authors will only write books and 
articles and blog posts if they can be quite certain that they will not be 
criminally punished in twenty years for something they wrote. Similarly, 
investors want certainty and stability more than anything else when they 
invest. No one wants to build a factory or create something that will be taken 
away from them in twenty years without just compensation being paid. The 
certainty and predictability offered by the Constitution has made this country 
the wealthiest country on the planet with by far the highest gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita of any of the G-20 constitutional democracies. 
Originalism in constitutional interpretation promotes the values of certainty 
and predictability. 
Fifth, the Constitution serves as a gag rule because it takes certain hot-
potato issues off the agenda of ordinary political discourse. We do not have 
fights in the United States as to what our national religion should be because 
the First Amendment precludes us from having a national religion.90 We also 
do not have fights over what speech should be censored or castes of people 
should be preferred because the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech 
and of the press91 and it forbids a caste system.92 Following the original 
public meaning of the Constitution promotes this goal as well. 
 
 88 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 89 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 90 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
 91 Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 92 Id. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
to their jurisdiction.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
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Sixth, the Constitution puts in place a system of intergenerational 
lawmaking because it recognizes that, just as some wars can only be 
fought—like World War II—by borrowing from our great-grandchildren, so, 
too, are some problems simply too big to solve with anything less than 
intergenerational lawmaking. This system allows us to legislate to bind our 
great-grandchildren in exchange for accepting the laws made by our great-
grandparents. 
Seventh, constitutional government is by definition limited 
government.93 The Constitution of the United States limits and divides power 
in four ways: (1) horizontally, among the three branches of the national 
government; (2) vertically, between the national government and the states; 
(3) by protecting individual rights with the federal Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment from intrusion by the states; and (4) between We the 
People, who are sovereign and consist of two-thirds of both Houses of 
Congress and three-quarters of the states, and every other institution of 
government or personal right. Following the original public meaning of the 
Constitution furthers this goal as well. 
Eighth, and finally, the Constitution is aspirational. Its aspirations are 
(1) to form a more perfect Union than existed under the Articles of 
Confederation; (2) to establish justice; (3) to insure domestic tranquility; (4) 
to provide for the common defense; (5) to promote the general welfare; and 
(6) to secure the blessings of liberty, to ourselves and our posterity.94 These 
goals are all promoted by having a written Constitution that is enforced 
through judicial review. 
When the Constitution originally went into effect, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote James Madison a letter in which he argued that the Constitution ought 
to sunset after twenty years. Jefferson reasoned that (1) the earth belongs to 
the living and not to the dead; (2) that every twenty years or so a new 
generation of people will come of age; and (3) that each new generation 
ought to be able to write a constitution as it sees fit.95 
 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 93 Thus, England since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 has been accurately described as being a 
constitutional monarchy. STEVEN GOW CALABRESI, BRADLEY G. SILVERMAN & JOSHUA BRAVER, THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 227 
(2016). 
 94 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 95 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 392–98 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
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Madison wrote Jefferson back to say that his twenty-year sunset clause 
was a terrible idea.96 He said people need predictability and certainty to 
flourish, that intergenerational lawmaking was often needed, and that there 
would be a lot of strategic gamesmanship that would go on prior to every 
twenty-year spasm of constitution-making. 
The last 230 years of American history have proven that Madison was 
right. The United States is the wealthiest nation in the world,97 the most 
militarily powerful nation in the world, the third-most-populous nation in the 
world,98 and the third-largest nation in the world by territory.99 It is truly a 
democratic empire unlike anything else the world has ever known. Our 
written Constitution of the One, the Few, and the Many, all selected at fixed 
intervals by the Many, has protected for us the values of “Life, Liberty, and 
the pursuit of Happiness.”100 To the extent that Professor Thayer wanted to 
water down our Constitution of 1787, like all the progressive intellectuals of 
 
 96 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 437–41 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). 
 97 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded in 2017 that the G-20 nations have the 
following GDP-per-capita rankings: 
1. United States 7th 
2. Australia 10th 
3. Canada 16th 
4. Germany 17th 
5. France 21st 
6. United Kingdom 22nd 
7. Japan 23rd 
8. Italy 25th 
9. South Korea 27th 
10. Saudi Arabia 36th 
11. Argentina 54th 
12. Russia 62nd 
13. Turkey 63rd 
14. Brazil 65th 
15. Mexico 69th 
16. China 71st 
17. India 139th 
IMF DATA MAPPER, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/ 
WEOWORLD [https://perma.cc/7C4W-VHHX]. 
 98 The United States ranks third behind India and China in population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
CURRENT POPULATION, https://www.census.gov/popclock/print.php?component=counter 
[https://perma.cc/JEL8-F5JD]. 
 99 Cent. Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison ∷ Area, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/279rank.html (last visited Apr. 2, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/A54L-ZZR2] (ranking the top four countries by territory as follows: (1) Russia, 
(2) Antarctica, (3) Canada, and (4) The United States). 
 100 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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his day,101 he was badly mistaken. Our written Constitution, enforced 
vigorously by the Supreme Court since 1954, has made us the happiest and 
the safest country in the world. 
III. ORIGINALISM, THAYER, AND HORIZONTAL JUDICIAL REVIEW  
PRIOR TO 1893 
To read Professor Thayer’s book today, one would think there was 
almost no horizontal judicial review besides the infamously wrong Dred 
Scott between 1790 and 1893. This is quite simply not true. Judicial review 
between 1789 and the 1890s, in my opinion, was an important element of the 
federal government’s control over the states, and it was therefore supported 
by the Executive and Legislative Branches. This is entirely consistent with 
the theory of the Privy Council origins of American judicial review as a form 
of vertical federalism umpiring enforcement, as sketched out above.102 
Professor Thayer makes a historical argument, however, that federal 
judicial power was not sustained horizontally against the Executive and 
Legislative Branches prior to 1893. In his account, Marbury’s formal 
assertion of the power of horizontal judicial review did not materialize until 
1893, when vertical judicial review had come to be accepted as a legitimate 
form of federalism umpiring control over the states. Judicial enforcement of 
the Bill of Rights did not begin until much later, with the first major cases 
being decided after the New Deal Revolution of 1937. Judicial enforcement 
of the Bill of Rights against the states and the national government alike was 
not fully operational until the Warren Court era of the 1960s. 
I agree with Professor Thayer that, as a realist matter, federal judicial 
power between 1789 and the 1890s was mostly asserted in vertical 
federalism cases, where the Supreme Court was acting as an agent of the 
central government in controlling the states. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
pronounced several important separation of powers decisions well before 
1893, none of which applied Professor Thayer’s rule of clear mistake. These 
cases demonstrate conclusively that horizontal judicial review arose much 
earlier than Professor Thayer acknowledges, and contradict his claim that by 
1893 the Court had established a rule of clear mistake in such cases. 
Horizontal judicial review is thus legitimate and well-grounded in history, as 
is vertical judicial review. 
In the early 1790s, well before Marbury v. Madison,103 the Supreme 
Court twice asserted the power of horizontal judicial review defensively to 
 
 101 SOUTHERN, supra note 19, at 32, 47, 53, 128. 
 102 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 103 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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protect the federal courts from being assigned nonjudicial work by Congress 
and the President. First, in 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson sent a 
letter to the Justices of the Supreme Court asking for their legal advice on 
nearly thirty questions related to a treaty with France and to the law of 
nations. Chief Justice John Jay wrote back a short letter to President 
Washington in which the Justices formally refused to answer Jefferson’s 
questions, asserting that they were not empowered under Article III to issue 
advisory opinions on abstract legal matters, but could only hear cases and 
controversies among legally adverse parties.104 This episode, known as The 
Correspondence of the Justices, was an important exercise of horizontal 
judicial power.105 No rule of clear mistake was cited. 
A second exercise of horizontal judicial power occurred a year earlier, 
in what is now called Hayburn’s Case.106 In this case, five of the six Supreme 
Court Justices held, while riding circuit, that Congress’s Invalid Pensions 
Act of 1792 was unconstitutional insofar as it gave judges power to set 
pensions for invalid Revolutionary War veterans, decisions which could then 
be completely revised by Executive Branch officials.107 The Justices held in 
essence that judicial power could only be invoked when there was a 
substantial likelihood that its exercise would make a difference in the real 
world. This holding, too, was an important exercise of horizontal judicial 
power, well before the 1890s, by refusing to impose a duty on the federal 
courts to perform an act mandated by an act of Congress. No rule of clear 
mistake was cited. 
The Correspondence of the Justices and Hayburn’s Case both involve 
a defensive exercise of horizontal judicial power in which the Court refused 
to act, as in Marbury, lest it be unconstitutionally burdened with extra chores. 
Nonetheless, there are several famous instances of horizontal judicial review 
in which the Supreme Court asserted itself offensively against the President. 
In Little v. Barreme, the Supreme Court held that President Thomas Jefferson 
did not have the inherent executive power to go beyond congressional 
legislation and order the seizure of American ships sailing to and from 
French ports.108 This case set an important limit on presidential power and 
foreshadows Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure 
 
 104 Letter from Supreme Court Justices to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (The 
Correspondence of the Justices), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-
13-02-0263 [https://perma.cc/BNY7-RCDN]. 
 105 See generally MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN GOW CALABRESI, MICHAEL W. 
MCCONNELL, SAMUEL L. BRAY & WILLIAM BAUDE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (3rd 
ed. 2017). 
 106 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
 107 Id. at 409. 
 108 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 175–76 (1804). 
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Case)109 in rejecting claims of inherent presidential power to seize property. 
No rule of clear mistake was cited. 
Three years later, in 1807, former Vice President Aaron Burr was 
indicted for treason on account of some shady dealings he had had in which 
he seemed to be trying to set up a regime he could govern on Mexican and 
Spanish land. President Thomas Jefferson took an obsessive interest in the 
Burr treason prosecution, which he micromanaged using his powers as law 
enforcement officer in chief.110 As luck would have it, Chief Justice John 
Marshall, while riding circuit, presided over Burr’s treason trial where he 
insisted on the Constitution’s requirement of two witnesses in open court for 
the proof of treason. The jury in Burr’s case ended up with Chief Justice 
Marshall’s guidance acquitting Burr, which infuriated Jefferson.111 This, too, 
seems to us to be an important early exercise of horizontal judicial review by 
the federal courts—this time without the courts being in a wholly defensive 
posture. The Burr trial was a really big deal at the time it occurred, and 
Jefferson lost while John Marshall won.112 It turned on the question of the 
constitutional definition of treason and was a major separation of powers 
case in which the federal courts successfully asserted judicial power against 
the executive branch in a highly charged political controversy. No rule of 
clear mistake was followed or cited. 
Jumping ahead thirty years to 1838, we find the Supreme Court’s 
landmark opinion in Kendall v. Stokes.113 In that case, Andrew Jackson’s 
close personal friend and political ally Amos Kendall, who was the 
Postmaster General of the United States, and therefore a key figure in 
handing out patronage jobs, refused to pay a plaintiff by the name of Stokes 
an amount of money awarded to Stokes by an auditor as expressly 
commanded by an act of Congress.114 Stokes sought a writ of mandamus 
ordering Kendall to pay him all that he was owed, and the Supreme Court 
ruled for Stokes and issued the writ.115 Kendall is thus not only the 
cornerstone administrative law case, but also an important assertion of the 
Supreme Court’s horizontal power of review. Once again, no rule of clear 
mistake was cited. 
 
 109 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 110 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL 
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 112 See id. 
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During the 1860s, the Supreme Court decided three notable horizontal 
judicial review cases. In The Prize Cases, the Court upheld the legality of 
President Lincoln’s blockade of Confederate ports prior to his receiving 
congressional approval for that blockade in the summer of 1861.116 In Ex 
parte Milligan, the Supreme Court sharply limited the government’s power 
to try civilians in military commissions.117 In Ex parte Garland, the Supreme 
Court invalidated Congress’s Act of January 24th, 1865, requiring oaths of 
loyalty to the Union as a precondition to bar admission as a bill of attainder 
even at the same time as Congress was impeaching President Andrew 
Johnson.118 Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions in these cases cited 
a rule of clear mistake. 
The Court retreated strategically in Ex parte McCardle, where it held 
that Congress could strip the Court of its jurisdiction under an 1867 federal 
Habeas Corpus Act.119 The very next year, however, the Court held in Ex 
parte Yerger that it retained jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in 
cases like Yerger’s and McCardle’s under the Judiciary Act of 1789.120 Ex 
parte Yerger makes it crystal clear that where there are two avenues to habeas 
review in the Supreme Court, Congress can shut off one but not necessarily 
the other.121 This is hardly a foreswearing of the power of horizontal, 
separation of powers judicial review. And again, no rule of clear mistake was 
cited. 
Professor Thayer’s claim that horizontal judicial review did not get 
going prior to 1893 is thus unpersuasive. To the contrary, the Supreme Court 
decided important separation of powers cases between 1792 and 1895, none 
of which questioned the authority of the federal courts to engage in 
horizontal umpiring or cited a rule of clear mistake. Even in Ex parte 
Merryman, in which Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus 
directing the release of John Merryman,122 which President Abraham Lincoln 
ignored, President Lincoln did not question the legality of the Court’s order 
but rather justified his disregard, in a July 4, 1861 address to a special session 
of Congress, on the ground that he had to violate this one small law to prevent 
the vast bulk of laws from being further violated in the eleven Confederate 
states rebelling against federal authority. Congress later ratified Lincoln’s de 
facto suspension of the writ. No one thought this meant that federal courts 
 
 116 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863). 
 117 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122–31 (1866). 
 118 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866). 
 119 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). 
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lacked the power of horizontal judicial review. Instead, it was widely 
understood that Justice Taney had exercised that power improperly and that 
President Lincoln’s response was appropriate given the dire circumstances 
of the spring of 1861, when Congress could not yet safely be called into 
special session. 
So far, I have mentioned horizontal exercises of the power of judicial 
review between 1792 and 1895 in horizontal separation of powers cases but 
not in horizontal federalism cases. A horizontal federalism case is one in 
which a federal court reviews the constitutionality of an act of Congress 
against a claim that it exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers. On this point, 
many, like Professor Thayer, fall back on a frequently made assertion that 
there were only two instances in which federal courts struck down an act of 
Congress on horizontal federalism grounds prior to the Civil War: Marbury 
v. Madison123 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.124 This statement is true so far as 
it goes, but it overlooks the fact that amongst all the controversy over those 
two cases, no one on either side ever contested the federal courts’ power, as 
Alexander Hamilton explicitly asserted in The Federalist No. 78,125 to engage 
in horizontal federalism judicial review. 
Thomas Jefferson’s complaint with Marbury was not with that case’s 
assertion of the power of horizontal judicial review in federalism cases. He 
instead disagreed with its dicta to the effect that the executive actions of 
cabinet secretaries were judicially reviewable and thus not protected by 
sovereign immunity. Similarly, the dissenters in Dred Scott did not take issue 
with the majority’s assertion of a horizontal power of judicial review in 
federalism cases generally. Instead, they argued quite correctly that (1) free 
African Americans could become citizens of the United States, and (2) 
Congress’s power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territories of the United States allowed it to outlaw slavery in a federal 
territory as the Continental Congress had done in 1787 under the Articles of 
Confederation. 
No one disputed that the power of horizontal judicial enforcement of 
enumerated federal powers was constitutional between 1803 and 1895. Even 
in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall said quite explicitly 
that 
[s]hould Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are 
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of 
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted 
 
 123 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
 124 See generally 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856). 
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to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a 
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not 
the law of the land.126 
The reason there were only two horizontal federalism cases decided by 
the Supreme Court prior to the Civil War was simply that Congress passed 
so few federal statutes during an era in which the Senate was evenly divided 
between slave states and free states. 
In fact, Professor Gerard Magliocca argues that the Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice Taney would have overruled McCulloch in the 1840s had 
not President Tyler twice vetoed acts of Congress renewing the Bank of the 
United States in violation of the Whig Party platform on which William 
Henry Harrison and John Tyler were elected President and Vice President in 
1840.127 President Jackson’s 1932 veto message regarding the renewal of the 
Bank of the United States explicitly disagreed with the reasoning of Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, and it is a fact that Presidents 
Jackson and Tyler killed the Bank of the United States for all time, 
notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall’s brilliant opinion in McCulloch. 
Several cases in addition to Marbury and Dred Scott further support the 
power of horizontal federalism judicial review. In Mayor of the City of New 
York v. Miln, the Supreme Court held that the City of New York had the 
power to control immigration into New York and to impose a tax on any ship 
captain who brought a pauper to the City, notwithstanding the Commerce 
Clause of the Federal Constitution.128 This decision of the Taney Court was 
technically a Dormant Commerce Clause case, but the Court’s opinion 
suggests it would have struck down as unconstitutional a federal statute 
enacted under the Commerce Clause compelling the states to admit 
immigrants and paupers.129 
A majority of the Taney Court was well-prepared to strike down federal 
laws on enumerated powers grounds even prior to Dred Scott. The Taney 
Court sharply departed from the Marshall Court’s construction of the 
Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden130 and Miln, and it sharply departed 
from the Marshall Court’s construction of the Contract Clause in Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward131 and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.132 There 
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is every reason to think that the Taney Court might well have done the same 
thing as to McCulloch had President Tyler not twice vetoed the renewal by 
Congress of the Bank of the United States in the 1840s. 
The Supreme Court did decide some very important horizontal 
federalism cases between 1803 and 1857 where it upheld the 
constitutionality of federal laws against enumerated powers challenges. 
Famous examples include Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,133 McCulloch, Cohens 
v. Virginia,134 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States.135 It has thus been 
widely recognized that the Supreme Court played a major role in legitimating 
federal power during this period of time.136 Professor Thayer overlooks the 
fact that the Supreme Court could not have legitimated the use of federal 
power in these cases, as Professor Bickel correctly argues it did, unless there 
was a very real possibility that the Supreme Court could have instead struck 
down claims of federal power rather than upholding them. 
Professor Thayer also overlooks the fact that during the Jeffersonian 
and Jacksonian eras it was constitutional orthodoxy that the federal 
government lacked the enumerated power to do many things, as is 
particularly illustrated by their repeated vetoes of laws that would have made 
internal improvements. The constitutionality of such laws, however, never 
reached the Supreme Court because Presidents Jefferson and Jackson vetoed 
them out of existence. Professor Thayer thus misleadingly argues that 
because the Supreme Court only struck down two acts of Congress prior to 
the Civil War, judicial power to decide horizontal federalism cases did not 
exist. To the contrary, the constitutional culture of the Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian eras was so committed to enumerated powers federalism that the 
Jacksonian Taney Court did not have many opportunities to strike down acts 
of Congress on enumerated powers grounds. 
This point is illustrated by the controversy over the constitutionality of 
internal improvements.137 This issue was very much on people’s minds when 
McCulloch upheld the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States on 
grounds broad enough to support the Hamiltonian, rather than the 
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Madisonian, reading of Congress’s spending power. James Madison had 
argued for the ratification of the Constitution in The Federalist, and at the 
Virginia ratifying convention, based upon a very narrow construction of the 
federal power to spend money. Madison thought that federal spending must 
be at least tangentially tied to one of the other specifically enumerated 
powers, such as regulating interstate or foreign commerce, or providing for 
the military. Madison claimed that Article I’s General Welfare Clause138 was 
not a specific grant of power, but a statement of purpose qualifying the power 
to tax. Pursuant to this understanding, President Madison, on March 3, 1817, 
vetoed an act of Congress proposing to spend federal money on internal 
improvements and canals on enumerated powers grounds. Madison 
specifically observed in issuing his veto that this use of the spending power 
exceeded the Spending Clause’s grant of legislative power. 
McCulloch, decided two years after Madison’s famous veto, is famous 
for its expansive, Hamiltonian conception of federal power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. McCulloch was controversial when it was 
decided not so much because it upheld the constitutionality of the Bank of 
the United States as because it implicitly repudiated President Madison’s 
narrow interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers in vetoing the 
internal improvements and canals bill. It is striking in this regard that 
President Madison’s successor, President Monroe, vetoed only one act of 
Congress during his eight years in office, and that was his veto of the 
Cumberland Road bill on May 4, 1822. Monroe’s veto reiterated Madison’s 
constitutional construction of the limits on the federal spending power. 
The idea that Congress lacked power under the Spending Clause to 
spend federal money to make internal improvements and to build canals led 
President Jackson to issue the famous Maysville Road veto on May 27, 
1830.139 The bill in question would have built a road between two cities in 
Kentucky as part of John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay’s American System 
program of Hamiltonian spending to build up a national infrastructure of 
roads, canals, and railroads. President Jackson vetoed at least six bills during 
his eight years as President on the ground that the federal government lacked 
the power to make internal improvements, including a bill to support the 
building of lighthouses and the placement of buoys. 
Presidents Tyler, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan all similarly vetoed 
internal improvements bills on enumerated powers grounds.140 It was indeed 
a staple of Jacksonian orthodoxy that Madison was right and Chief Justice 
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Marshall was wrong about the extent of the federal government’s 
enumerated powers. President Jackson said as much when he killed the Bank 
of the United States by vetoing a bill that would have renewed the Bank’s 
charter on July 10, 1832, making the scope of federal power a key issue in 
the 1832 presidential election, which Jackson then won in a landslide.141 
The Supreme Court did strike down two major federal statutes prior to 
1893, when Professor Thayer posits that horizontal judicial review could 
only be exercised when Congress had made a clear mistake and its statute 
was irrational. In Hepburn v. Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Legal Tender Act, which authorized paper money during the Civil War, in a 
four-to-three decision on enumerated powers grounds.142 Critics of this case 
did not disagree that the Court had the power to decide horizontal federalism 
cases; they argued instead that federal power was broad enough to allow for 
the printing of paper money. The decision in Hepburn led to the adoption of 
a court-packing bill that added two new, pro-paper money justices to the 
Supreme Court, which, in 1871, overturned its decision in Hepburn, again 
without questioning the federal courts’ power to strike down acts of 
Congress that exceed its enumerated powers.143 
In 1883, the Supreme Court also struck down, on enumerated powers 
grounds, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases,144 by a vote 
of eight to one. Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter in those cases, and he 
did not claim that the majority lacked the power to enforce the limits of 
Congress’s enumerated powers. Justice Harlan argued instead (quite 
correctly) that the majority egregiously misread both the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on enumerated powers 
grounds.145 This seminal case established long before 1893 that the Supreme 
Court applied neither a rule of clear mistake nor a rational basis test in cases 
of horizontal judicial review. My point is only that I think Professor Thayer 
is wrong about the standard of review even though I despise the majority 
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. 
It is time to step back from the case law and from my quibbles with 
Professor Thayer, and look at the big picture of American judicial review, 
especially in light of the British imperial history discussed above. It seems 
clear to me that when Madison sought a federal veto power over state laws 
at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, he was asking for Congress 
 
 141 See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 110, at 106–19. 
 142 75 U.S. 603, 625 (8 Wall.) (1870). 
 143 Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1871). 
 144 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
 145 See id. at 32–36, 58–60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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to have the same power vis-à-vis the states as had been enjoyed by the King-
in-Council, i.e., by the Privy Council from 1607 until 1776. The King-in-
Council during the colonial period similarly vetoed colonial laws and heard 
judicial appeals from the thirteen colonies. Madison’s request for federal 
power to veto state laws was thus much less radical than many might 
otherwise have supposed given that the King-in-Council had exercised such 
a veto power for 169 years! 
The emergence of vertical judicial review in federalism cases in the 
United States, as chronicled by Professor Thayer, seems then to be a 
continuation and a deepening of the colonial practice. For obvious reasons, 
it was a lot easier to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States sitting 
in Washington, D.C., or to the Justices riding circuit, than to the King-in-
Council sitting in London. As a result, there were many more appeals heard, 
and the federal courts became, especially after 1875, a central tool by which 
the national government controlled the states. The Supreme Court 
undoubtedly acquired legitimacy as a result of its enforcement of judicial 
federalism in umpiring disputes, and this legitimacy undoubtedly 
emboldened the Court when it began applying horizontal federalism 
umpiring to limit Congress’s enumerated powers. Madison thus got his 
federal veto over state laws after all in the form of vertical federal judicial 
review. 
One additional point remains to be made about the origins of judicial 
review in the United States. As Professor Thayer notes, originally the power 
of constitutional review was understood as being departmental such that each 
Department of the federal government—Congress, the President, and the 
Supreme Court—had the power of constitutional review when it was 
performing its own distinctive functions. Thus Congress reviewed laws for 
constitutionality before it passed them, the President reviewed laws like the 
Defense of Marriage Act for constitutionality before he executed them,146 
and the courts reviewed acts of Congress for constitutionality when they 
were presented with cases or controversies concerning those laws. This 
system of departmental judicial review has substantially changed to a system 
that I would call one of judicial supremacy, in which the Supreme Court is 
the last and only arbiter of constitutional meaning. Just as presidents have by 
practice laid claim to “the foreign affairs power,” so, too, have the federal 
courts largely by practice laid claim to “the constitutional review power.” 
Members of Congress and Presidents no longer make a serious effort to 
engage in constitutional review when they exercise their power, and they 
largely leave such matters to the federal courts. 
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But there are two very important respects not mentioned, in which 
federal courts are not absolutely supreme in the exposition of constitutional 
law. First, U.S. Supreme Court Justices do not themselves choose new 
members of the Supreme Court, as do some supreme court justices in India, 
the United Kingdom, and Israel. The U.S. Supreme Court instead follows the 
presidential and senatorial election returns. New Presidents and Senates get 
to pick new Supreme Court Justices and eventually a new political 
movement like the New Deal or the Nixon–Reagan–Trump popular social 
movement can challenge judicial supremacy and change constitutional law. 
Efforts to challenge judicial supremacy can be fought off for a while by 
strategic retirement, which the Justices of the Supreme Court do engage in, 
but eventually the grim reaper takes his toll. Strategic retirement postpones 
efforts to make the Supreme Court follow the election returns but, ultimately, 
over fifty years, it is true that the Court will follow the election returns to 
some degree. The Supreme Court is always oligarchic and is always an elite 
group, as Professor Ran Hirschl might say.147 But it is sometimes an elite 
liberal group and at other times an elite conservative group, depending on 
presidential and senatorial election returns. 
Second, the United States does not have a system of absolute judicial 
supremacy because there is no tradition in our constitutional law of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments, as there is in Germany, India, 
Brazil, and Turkey. Constitutional amendments have thus been successfully 
used on four occasions to overturn Supreme Court opinions, as with the 
Eleventh Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixteenth 
Amendment, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 
Aside from formal constitutional amendments, some constitutionalists 
have observed that there is often “dialogue” between the Supreme Court and 
legislative bodies. For example, in response to Furman v. Georgia’s 
suggestion that capital punishment might categorically violate the Eighth 
Amendment,148 some thirty States disagreed between 1972 and 1976, leading 
the Supreme Court to back down and allow capital punishment with added 
procedural safeguards in Gregg v. Georgia.149 It is thus an overstatement to 
say that the United States has a constitutional regime of absolute judicial 
supremacy. 
 
 147 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 10–16 (2004). 
 148 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
 149 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976). See generally DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE 
CULTURAL LIFE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2016). 
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Finally, when the Supreme Court does something truly controversial as 
in Dred Scott, Lochner, or Roe v. Wade,150 the political branches tend to 
“rediscover” the virtues of departmentalism, and they push back very hard 
against the Court. In a letter written in the 1830s, Madison argued that the 
judicial bench, “when happily filled,” is usually the surest and best expositor 
of constitutional meaning. Madison’s letter implies that when the judicial 
bench is “unhappily filled,” however, both Congress and the President have 
the constitutional power and duty to check and balance the Supreme Court. 
What can we say, then, about the origins of judicial review in the United 
States? First, it owes a lot to the prior British colonial umpiring practice. 
Second, there has been vigorous vertical federalism umpiring since the 
beginning of the republic. Third, there were, between 1792 and 1895, several 
cases in which the Supreme Court enforced horizontal, separation of powers 
boundary lines against the political branches of the federal government. And 
fourth, the Supreme Court claimed the power to police horizontal 
enumerated powers in Marbury, McCulloch, and Dred Scott, and no one 
disputed this claim (although all three opinions were widely criticized on 
other grounds) until Professor Thayer came along. Between the Civil War 
and United States v. E. C. Knight Co.151 in 1895, the Supreme Court struck 
down major acts of Congress in Hepburn v. Griswold and in the Civil Rights 
Cases. No major Bill of Rights cases were decided until well into the 
twentieth century. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Thayer and the Progressive Movement of which he was a key 
part failed to appreciate how wonderful the intellectual world of the 1780s 
was, especially as compared to the 1890s. In the 1780s most intellectuals 
believed that 
[a]ll men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and 
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and 
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.152 
The 1780s were alive with reverence for England’s Ancient 
Constitution, which predated the Norman invasion of England in 1066. The 
1780s was also alive with classicists who were interested in the Aristotelian 
theory of the Mixed Regime, a constitutional structure that has endured in 
the United States for 230 years. The 1780s produced the world’s first 
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constitutional democracy, the world’s shortest constitution, and the world’s 
oldest constitution. The regime that the 1780s set in motion was vitally 
perfected by Abraham Lincoln and our Second Founding during the 1860s, 
which was also a decade where people believed in human equality and liberty 
thanks to John Stuart Mill.153 It is no accident that the Gettysburg Address 
begins with the words, “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought 
forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty and dedicated to 
the proposition that all men are created equal.”154 
The British Empire bequeathed two valuable constitutional ideas to the 
United States, of which we made great use: first, the idea of a written 
constitution and Bill of Rights, and second, the idea of a system of judicial 
review to enforce our written constitution. I have tried briefly in this Essay 
to show why written constitutions and judicial review are a normatively 
desirable thing, and, in doing so, why I disagree with Professor Thayer’s 
theory of radical judicial restraint. Finally, I have considered the Supreme 
Court’s actual practice of judicial review from 1790 to 1893 to show that the 
Court did not follow a rule of clear mistake during this period of time, 
contrary to Professor Thayer’s claim. 
I will not say much about the world of the 1890s except that it was a 
time when most intellectuals did not believe that “all men are born free and 
equal.” This ignorance led to European colonialism, Jim Crow segregation 
in the United States, the eugenics movement in the United States and in 
Germany, the rise of the expert, undemocratic agency, and, finally, the move 
from eugenics to the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. After 1945, however, the 
world was reborn, and Eleanor Roosevelt—the first Ambassador to the 
United Nations—secured the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It bears quoting the first Article of the Universal Declaration, 
in which one can hear the glory of the American Revolution: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood.155 
Finally, by 1948, the world had gotten back to its origins in the 1780s 
and 1860s, and repudiated Social Darwinism. 
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